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WATCHING YOUR NEIGHBOR'S CHILD: IS
BABYSITTING REALLY A BUSINESS PURSUIT?
A COMMENT ON DWELLO V. AMERICAN
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY
Roger 0. Steggerda*
Patti Kenyon was caring for Stefanie Dwello, the child of her neighbor,
when Stefanie was attacked by the Kenyons' dog, severely injuring her face,
head, and eye. American Reliance Insurance Company, the Kenyons' home-
owners' insurance carrier, refused to defend or indemnify the Kenyons, basing
its argument on the business pursuits exclusion in the Kenyons' homeowners
insurance policy. Following a one-day bench trial in Dwello v. American Reli-
ance Ins. Co.,2 the district court granted the American Reliance petition for de-
claratory relief. Dwello appealed, and the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed
the lower court decision, finding the language of the business pursuits exclu-
sion to be "clear and unambiguous" in excluding coverage.3
Courts of many jurisdictions have struggled to interpret the business pur-
suits exclusion in a homeowners insurance policy. In Dwello, its first review of
the issue, the Supreme Court of Nevada probably should have struggled more
before it affirmed a trial court decision that denied liability insurance coverage
for injuries sustained by a child while she was being cared for by a neighbor.
The Dwello court may have too quickly glossed over the difficulties of other
courts in interpreting the business pursuits exclusion.
This Comment considers whether either the business pursuits exclusion or
its exception ought to have been applied in Dwello. First is a brief review of
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There is considerable variation in word usage in various treatises, law review articles, and
court opinions. Except as these expressions appear in quotations, certain conventions are
followed throughout this paper: "homeowners", as it is used to describe a type of insurance
policy, is a single word, without an apostrophe; "business pursuits" will appear without quo-
tations; "nonbusiness" is treated as a single word, without a hyphen; "child care" is two
words; and, "babysit" or its derivatives is one word.
2 990 P.2d 190 (1999) (per curiam).
3id. at 191.
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some of the legal principles underlying insurance policy construction.4 Next is
an examination of the background of homeowners insurance, with emphasis on
the varying interpretations of the business pursuits exclusion in other jurisdic-
tions,5 the exception to the exclusion, 6 and the various analytical approaches
that have been employed by other courts. Then, the Dwello decision is pre-
sented,s followed by an analysis and critique of the Dwello opinion, along with
the introduction of a seven-factor test for determining the applicability of the
exclusion. 9 Finally, this Comment concludes that Dwello was poorly decided,
and that the Supreme Court of Nevada should have taken the opportunity pre-
sented by Dwello to more thoroughly analyze and articulate the business pur-
suits exclusion as it should be applied in Nevada.'
0
I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING INSURANCE POLICY CONSTRUCTION
Insurance contracts are unique and are severed from normal contract law
by most jurisdictions. '' The severance is needed primarily because of the dis-
parate bargaining positions in an insurance transaction. 12 Modem insurance
policies are contracts of adhesion;' 3 the insurance company generally offers the
policy on a "take it or leave it" basis. 14 Consequently, when a court determines
that a clause in an insurance policy is ambiguous, 15 it construes the clause most
4 See infra Part 1.
5 See infra Part 11 and Part II.A.
6 See infra Part II.B.
7 See infra Part II.B. 1-3.
8 See infra Part III.A.
9 See infra Part III.B.
1o See infra Conclusion.
11 Jeffrey R. Pawelski, Note, SOUTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT: Insurers Don't Need
the Court to "Babysit " Them: An Argument for Reasonable Expectations in American Fam-
ily Insurance Co. v. Elliot, 41 S.D. L. REV. 375 (1996), citing Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A
Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1463-64 (1989).
12 Id. citing Joseph E. Minnock, Comment, Protecting the Insured from an Adhesion Insur-
ance Policy: The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Utah, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 837,
839.
13 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 4.06[a], at 4-35 (2d ed.,
1999), stating ".... contract doctrine and theory involves so-called contracts of adhesion, so
named because the party with less bargaining power must adhere to the terms dictated by the
party with more bargaining power if the contract is to be made at all."
14 Id. "In a sense, the typical insurance contract is one of 'super-adhesion' in that the con-
tract is completely standardized and not even reviewed prior to contract formation." Id. §
4.06[b], at 4-37.
15 BARRY R. OSTRAGER AND THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE
DISPUTES § 1.02, 9 (10' ed. 2000). ("An ambiguity exists when a word or phrase is reasona-
bly susceptible to more than one construction."). See also STEMPEL, supra note 13, § 4.08[b],
at 4-72 ("A term is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible of more than one construc-
tion. In making this assessment, courts.., apply a plain and ordinary meaning analysis to
the matter from the perspective of a lay person.")
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strongly against the insurer.' 6 Contra-insurer rules of construction especially
apply when there is ambiguity in an exclusionary term or clause.' 7 "Exclusions
are generally construed narrowly, while exceptions to exclusions are generally
construed broadly to find coverage."' 8 If a contract provision is found to be
ambiguous, "invocation of the doctrine [contra proferentem or contra-insurer]
becomes a nearly automatic finding" in favor of the insured. 19
Construing ambiguous policy language in favor of the insured is justified
by the doctrine of reasonable expectations, which allows a court to decide
whether an insured's expectation of coverage is reasonable under the circum-
stances unique to the insurance transaction. If an insured has a reasonable
expectation of insurance coverage in a given circumstance, a court will gener-
ally find coverage if it has also found the policy language ambiguous.
22
16 OSTRAGER, supra note 15 § 1.03[b], at 14; See also STEMPEL, supra note 13, § 4.04, at 4-
23-24 (characterizing contra proferentem ("against the author") as "the most important Latin
phrase in insurance contracting, and perhaps in contract interpretation generally. The maxim
provides that ambiguous contract language is to be construed against the person that drafted
the contract. The theory underlying the rule is that the drafter was the person in the best po-
sition to avoid the ambiguity. In insurance law, since the insurer is nearly always the drafter
as well, it is often referred to as the contra-insurer doctrine.")
17 OSTRAGER, supra note 15, § 1.03[b], at 15, stating "Exclusionary clauses 'never grant
coverage, but rather limit the scope of the basic protection statement,"' citing Fresard v.
Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., Mich. 327 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Mich. 1982).
18 OSTRAGER, supra note 15, § 1.03[b], at 16. See also STEMPEL, supra note 13, § 4.06[d],
at 4-49, stating, "Courts also operate under the maxim that doubts about a term are to be re-
solved in favor of coverage in order to promote the basic purpose of the insurance policy."
Stempel also states that courts are unlikely to exclude "boilerplate" from an insurance con-
tract, but may be likely to interpret a standardized term or phrase "narrowly or in accord with
the policyholder's viewpoint in order to maximize coverage." Id.
19 STEMPEL, supra note 13, 4.08, at 4-60.
20 See generally, ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25D (2d ed.
1996). (The emergence and growth of the doctrine of reasonable expectations has come to
require some ambiguity in policy language for the doctrine to be applicable.) See also
OSTRAGER, supra note 15, at § 1.03[b][2][A], 20, stating, "The 'reasonable expectations'
doctrine is a principle by which policy language is construed in accordance with the objec-
tively reasonable expectations of the insured."
21 Pawelski, supra note 11, at 375.
22 JERRY, supra note 20. However, see, e.g., STEMPEL, supra note 13, § 4.09. The reason-
able expectations doctrine is by no means universally interpreted or applied by courts of dif-
ferent states. "Reasonable expectations analysis takes several forms ranging on a continuum
from use only as a near last-resort means of resolving ambiguous contract language (the ver-
sion of the approach normally least helpful to policyholders) to use as a principle of insur-
ance law that overrides clear and obvious policy language (the version of the approach that is
normally most helpful to policyholders)." Id. § 4.09[d], at 4-147. Thus, the lowest common
denominator among the various applications of the doctrine appears to be "ambiguity."
"Even where equities seem to favor the policyholder, most courts, even those not completely
hostile to the [reasonable expectations] doctrine, are reluctant to use expectations analysis
unless the policy text at issue is ambiguous, hidden, or surprising." Id. § 4.09[d], at 4-130-
31.
Stempel proposes "that courts adopt the following role for expectations analysis in cover-
age disputes: the objectively reasonable expectations of both the policyholder and the insurer
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The Supreme Court of Nevada has acknowledged these principles. In
Farmers Ins. Group v. Stonik,23 the court observed, "an insurance policy is a
contract of adhesion and should be interpreted broadly, affording the greatest
possible coverage to the insured." 24  In Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Young,25 the
court stated, "When an ambiguity is found, the policy should be construed to
effectuate the reasonable expectations of the insured." 26  Both Stonik and
Young involved lower court rulings in favor of the insureds, reflecting ambigui-
ties in automobile policy language. In both cases, however, the Supreme Court
reversed, after finding the insurance policy provisions to be "clear and unambi-
guous." 
27
Because there is significant standardization and uniformity in insurance
policies, it is not surprising that courts from various jurisdictions have struggled
with the interpretations of the same or similar policy provisions, and often have
found similar ambiguities. One such provision is the "business pursuits exclu-
sion" from liability coverage in homeowners insurance policies, the issue in
Dwello v. American Reliance Ins. Co.,28 and the subject of this Comment.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE HOMEOWNERS POLICY
In the late 1950's, insurers created a single insurance policy, called "home-
owners", which incorporated protection against various types of risks, such as
fire, theft, and personal liability, which formerly could only be covered under
separate insurance policies. 29 These new policies included coverage for the in-
sured's dwelling and contents, additional living expenses necessitated by dam-
age to the dwelling, and personal liability coverage.30 Although some home-
owners policies provide limited coverage or are restricted to named perils, the
(and beneficiaries and other interested parties such as a lender or guarantor) should routinely
be consulted in order to provide the background context.., for determining the meaning of a
disputed policy term." Id. § 4.09[d], at 4-157. Further, "it is a mistake to relegate expecta-
tions analysis to use only when the text at issue is so facially unclear as to be ambiguous as a
matter of law.... Rather than creating this hurdle of ambiguity as a prerequisite to use of
expectations analysis, courts should be willing to utilize expectations analysis to assist the
court in determining whether language is ambiguous and finding the meaning of a disputed
term."Id. § 4.09[d], at 4-158.
23 110 Nev. 64, 867 P.2d 389 (1994).
24 Id. at 67.
25 108 Nev. 328, 832 P.2d 376 (1992).
26 Young, 832 P.2d at 379 n.3, quoting Nat'l Fire Union Ins. Co. v. Caesars Palace, 106 Nev.
330, 792 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Nev. 1990).
27 Stonik, 867 P.2d at 391; Young, 832 P.2d at 379. The Court does not always find in favor
of the insurance carier. For example, in Powers v. United Services Automobile Ass 'n, 979
P.2d 1286, 1999 Nev. LEXIS 13, the Court held that a misstatement by the insured during
the insurance investigation was not material and that the insurance carrier was liable for in-
surance coverage.
28 990 P.2d 190 (1999) (per curiam), 1999 Nev. LEXIS 76.
29 ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 60B[b] at 341-43 (2d ed. 1996).
30 Id.
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more common policies provide coverage against all perils unless excluded from
coverage under the policy.
31
Several types of personal liability insurance policies, and the liability sec-
tions of virtually all homeowners insurance policies, contain a business pursuit
exclusion.32 Commonly, the business pursuits provision is fairly broad,33 stat-
ing that personal liability and medical payments to others do not apply to bod-
ily injury or property damage "arising out of business pursuits of any insured..
. .,,34 Often, the exclusion carries with it an exception almost equally broad,
which states that the exclusion does not apply to "activities which are ordinarily
incident to non-business pursuits .... .35
This section explores the struggle of courts in various jurisdictions to inter-
pret and balance the exclusion and its exception, particularly as the provisions
apply to child care in the home, and how many courts have interpreted the di-
vergent viewpoints to find that the provisions are ambiguous. 3 6 Some have
found its lack of clarity so difficult to apply that questions of its application are
"resolvable only in specific factual contexts." 37
A. The Business Pursuits Exclusion
"The business pursuits exclusion is intended to apply to all activities that
are involved in furtherance of any business, trade, occupation or profession."
3 8
The business need not be one's sole full-time occupation. Part-time business
activities also are often excluded, because many courts have held that the busi-
ness pursuit must be continuous, regular activity and must constitute the in-
sured's principal occupation or means of livelihood.
3 9
31 Id. For example, a dwelling would be insured against damage by fire, but deliberate arson
by the homeowner would be excluded. Most policies have deductibles and policy limits, so
that homeowners often purchase floaters or endorsements to provide extraordinary coverage
for art, antiques, or jewelry, for example. Further, people often purchase personal umbrella
policies to provide liability coverage beyond the limits of their homeowners policies.32 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4501.10 at 271 (Berdal ed. 1979).
33 DAVID J. MARCHITELLI, CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF "BUSINESS PURSUITS"
EXCLUSION PROVISION IN GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY, 35 A.L.R. 5th 375.
34 EMERIC FISCHER AND PETER NASH SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW, app. B, B-16
(2d ed. 1994).35 id.
36 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Reed, 873 S.W. 2d 698 (Tex. 1993). Ambigu-
ity, of course, usually works to the advantage of the insured, because, generally, when a
court determines that a clause in an insurance contract is ambiguous, it construes the clause
"most strongly against the insurer." See 43 AM. JUR. 2D INSURANCE
§ 283, at 357 (1982).
37 MARCHITELLI, supra note 33, at 410, citing State Mut. Cyclone Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 216
N.W.2d 606 (Mich. 1974).
38 APPLEMAN, supra note 32, at 276-77; See also Home Insurance Co. v. Aurigemma, 257
N.Y.S. 2d 980 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1965)(examining various insurance policy and dic-
tionary definitions of "business", "trade", "occupation", and "profession.").
39 APPLEMAN, supra note 32, at 271-72; MARCHITELLI, supra note 33, at 448; 48 A.L.R.3d
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The business pursuits exclusion is interpreted to apply to activities that are
regular or continuous, and are conducted for the primary purpose of earning in-
come or profit. Courts employ a two-part test requiring that the elements of
"continuity" and "profit motive" be established in order to characterize an ac-
tivity as a business pursuit. In this two-part test, first articulated in Home Ins.
Co. v. Aurigemma, "continuity" is defined as a customary activity or stated
occupation, and "profit motive" requires a showing that the activity is a means
of livelihood, gainful employment, gaining subsistence or profit, or earning a
living.
But even the Aurigemma two-part test has added little clarity as to whether
an activity is a business pursuit for purposes of the exclusion. As reviewed in
the following discussion, activities that were for either an indefinite or definite
period, temporary or permanent, or conducted over a long or a very brief period
of time have been characterized as "continuous", and findings of "profit mo-
tive" have ranged from token remuneration to substantial, primary income.
The business pursuits exclusion in a homeowners policy applies to any ac-
tivity involving the insured's employment, trade or profession. With the prolif-
eration of home-based businesses, full-time and part-time, whether an activity
may be characterized as a business pursuit is not usually a matter of definition.
Rather, it is "almost always a factual question presented for the determination
by a court." 42 In the specific area of home child care, courts often have looked
to the presence of additional factors to make that determination.
43
There appears to be a level of home child care service that courts will not
consider a business pursuit even when the activity meets the Aurigemma two-
part test. In West Virginia, the Supreme Court decided that a grandmother who
was being paid eighty dollars per month by the State to watch her grandson was
not engaged in a business pursuit, because she was not licensed and did not ad-
vertise her services.44 To assist them in determining continuity or profit mo-tive, courts have considered such other factors as the period of time that the in-
1096, 1100 (1973); See, e.g., Moncivais v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 430 N.W.2d 438, 440
(Iowa 1988); Virginia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hagy, 232 Va. 472, 475, 352 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1987);
Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Johnson, 294 S.E.2d 116, 118 (W.Va. 1982).
40 MARCHITELLI, supra note 33, at 411.
4' 257 N.Y.S. 2d 980 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1965). After reviewing the key words in
the policy language, Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, and the Ox-
ford Universal Dictionary (3 d Rev. Ed.), the Aurigemma court concluded that "...two ele-
ments are present in almost every definition, either expressly or by implication: first, conti-
nuity and secondly, the profit motive." Id. at 985. The court held that ". . . defendant
Aurigemma, in performing the electrical work for his friend . . . was not engaged in any
business activity or in the pursuit of any business within the contemplation or purview of the
exclusionary clause in the plaintiff's policy." Id at 987.
42 APPLEMAN, supra note 32, at 273.
43 Deborah Kravitz, et al, Survey: Developments in Maryland Law, 1988-89, 49 MD. L. REV.
509, 816-18 (1990).
44 Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Johnson, 294 S.E.2d 116, 120-21 (W.Va. 1982). (The court ob-
served that the same department that paid Ms. Johnson also issued day care licenses.)
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sured cared for children;45 the number of children cared for;46 whether the in-
sured expected substantial remuneration;4 7 whether the insured was licensed or• 48
registered with the state as a child care provider; or whether the insured ad-
vertised services as a child care provider.
4 9
The presence of any one of these factors could establish a business pursuit,
whether or not the court applies the Aurigemma standards of continuity and
profit motive. If any of these factors are present, the child care provider may
need to provide other evidence showing the absence of a profit motive or conti-
• 50
nuity of service.
If it is concluded that an injury arose out of the business pursuits of the in-
sured, the inquiry is not finished. Most policies contain an exception to the ex-
clusion. 51 If the activity that resulted in the injury was "ordinarily incident to
nonbusiness pursuits," the business pursuits exclusion may not be invoked.
B. The Exception to the Exclusion: "Ordinarily Incident to Nonbusiness
Pursuits"
When an activity such as horseplay, or a purely social amenity such as pre-
paring coffee, has lost its work-related identification, it becomes an activity
"incidental to non-business pursuits."5 2 It is not clear whether child care or
babysitting in the home for which some remuneration is received is excluded or• 53
is considered to be incident to nonbusiness pursuits.
Interpreting the exclusion and its exception has proven to be difficult even
within the same jurisdiction. In State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Reed,54 for ex-
ample, the Texas Supreme Court held that the business pursuits exclusion was
ambiguous and did not apply to the Reed suit, and further determined that the
maintenance of a fence around a swimming pool was ordinarily incident to a
nonbusiness pursuit.55 Yet, only five years later, in State Farm Fire & Casu-
45 Burt v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 720 F.Supp. 82, 85 (N.D. Tex. 1989). (The provider cared
for the child for a set time period daily for three months prior to the injury); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Kelsey, 678 P.2d 748, 750 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) cert. denied, 683 P.2d 91 (1984); Haley v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 529 A.2d 394, 396 (N.H. 1987) (per curiam).
46 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Moore, 430 N.E.2d 641, 643 (I11. App. 2d 1981).
47 Virginia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hagy, 352 S.E.2d 316, 319 (Va. 1987); Moore, 430 N.E.2d at
643; Kelsey, 678 P.2d at 750. See also infra Part IV A.1.b.48 Republic Ins. Co. v. Piper, 517 F.Supp. 1103, 1106 (D.Colo. 1981); Moore, 430 N.E.2d at
643; Hagy, 352 S.E.2d at 318-19; Haley, 529 A.2d at 396.
49 Moore, 430 N.E.2d at 643; Hagy, 352 S.E.2d at 318; Kelsey, 678 P.2d at 750.
50 Kravitz, supra note 43, at 818.
51 FISCHER, supra note 34.
52 APPLEMAN, supra note 32, § 4501.11,279.
53 Id. at 280.
14 873 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1993). (In Reed, a child being cared for crawled through a fence
that separated a play area from the swimming pool and drowned in a puddle of water on a
tarp covering the pool.)
55 H. Michelle Caldwell, Insurance Law, 52 SMU L. REV. 1283, 1306 (1999), citing Reed,
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alty v. Vaughan,56 the same court cited the Reed decision when it noted "not
every difference in interpretation of a contract or an insurance policy amounts
to an ambiguity. ' '57 The Vaughan court rejected the court of appeals' conclu-
sion that Reed invariably stands for the proposition that the business pursuits
exclusion and its exception are ambiguous in the context of home child care.58
In Reed, the child crawled through a fence and drowned in a puddle on a cov-
ered swimming pool; in Vaughan, the care-giver buckled the infant in a car
seat, covered him in a blanket, and left him in a closet, resulting in a criminal
conviction for child endangerment. The Vaughan court concluded that the
business pursuits exclusion in Solis' homeowner policy was not ambiguous
when viewed in light of the child-endangering activity for which Solis was
convicted.
59
The seemingly disparate holdings of the Texas Supreme Court in Reed and
Vaughan are illustrative. Courts generally have found it difficult to reconcile
the business pursuits exclusion and its exception. Three dominant lines of
analysis of the exception have emerged.
60
Following Crane v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,6 1 the first line of
analysis suggests that child care is generally incident to nonbusiness pursuits so
long as the insured would ordinarily care for her own children even if she were
not caring for other children for compensation. A second line of analysis,
originating with Stanley v. American Fire and Casualty Co.,62 suggests that the
activity that resulted in injury to the child was negligent supervision, and thus is
ordinarily incident to the business duties of caring for children for pay. Third,
under GulfIns. Co. v. Tilley,63 the specific activity that resulted in the injury is
examined to determine whether that specific activity was incident to business
pursuits or to nonbusiness pursuits.
64
873 S.W.2d at 701, n.7.
56 968 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1998). (The Vaughan's infant son was in the care of Solis, who
buckled him into a car seat, threw a blanket over his head and left him in a closet. Solis was
convicted of child endangerment after law enforcement officers discovered the Vaughan boy
and other unattended children. State Farm refused to defend Solis on the basis of the busi-
ness pursuits exclusion.)
57 Caldwell, supra note 55, quoting Vaughan, 968 S.W.2d at 934.
58 Vaughan, 968 S.W.2d at 934.
59 Caldwell, supra note 55, at 1307, citing to Vaughan, 968 S.W.2d at 934.
60 Among the many sources reviewed, two have provided very clear reviews of the various
approaches to the exception to the business pursuits exclusion. The author relies upon the
organization of material in Kravitz, supra note 43, at 813, and in Moncivais v. Farm Bureau
Mutual Ins. Co., 430 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa 1988).
61 485 P.2d 1129 (Cal. 1971) (en banc).
62 361 So. 2d 1030 (Ala. 1978).
63 280 F.Supp. 60 (N.D. Ind. 1967) aff'd, 393 F.2d 119 (7t' Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
64 A fourth approach is also considered in Moncivais. The Moncivais court cited to Foster v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 637 S.W.2d 655 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), which held that the language
of the exception is ambiguous and must be interpreted in favor of the insured. Thus, this
"fourth" approach is not to consider the exception at all.
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1. The Crane Analysis.
Ms. Chamberlain had been providing child-care for Crane's two small
children for about two months when Andrea Crane, two and one-half years old,
suffered bums to her hand, wrist, and fingers. Chamberlain was a housewife
with two young children whom she was caring for simultaneously with the
Crane children. She had no business activities inside or outside her home, and
was receiving $25 per week (plus groceries) for her care of the Crane children.
The defendant, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, denied coverage, rely-
ing on the business pursuits exclusion.
6 5
The Crane court went straight to the exception without any direct consid-
eration of whether the business pursuits exclusion should have applied, 66 and
found that Chamberlain's care of the Crane children was incident to a nonbusi-
ness pursuit. The California Supreme Court held that:
Assuming that the care of the child constituted a business pursuit, such duties
under the circumstances presented here were clearly incident to Mrs. Cham-
berlain's nonbusiness regimen of maintaining a household and supervising her
own children. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of an activity more ordinarily
incident to a noncommercial pursuit than home care of children.
67
Courts have subsequently criticized Crane because it seemed to suggest
that a homeowner policy would cover any injury that occurred at day care so• . . 68
long as providers also cared for their own children. Cases that followed the
Crane approach have tended to do so without serious analysis; the courts
merely quote the above passage, announce their approval, and choose the inter-
pretation most favorable to the insured.
69
There has been little refinement of the Crane reasoning, and there is con-
tinuing criticism that it sweeps too broadly. Since 1983, no court has fol-
lowed the Crane approach, possibly due to its lack of a solid analytical founda-
tion and its simple declaration that if providers are parents who care for their
own children at home, any additional, compensated child care at that home• 71
automatically becomes incident to the nonbusiness pursuit of parenting.
65 Crane, at 1130.
66 Since the Crane court found the exception to be applicable, any consideration of the ex-
clusion itself would have been irrelevant.
67 Crane, at 1131. The cited passage appears in whole or in part in nearly every court opin-
ion in which the exception to the business pursuits exclusion is analyzed.
68 Kravitz, supra note 43, at 820, citing State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Moore, 430
N.E.2d 641,645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
69 Kravitz, supra note 43, at 820. See, e.g., Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Goodall, 658 S.W.2d 32,
34-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Collins, 222 S.E.2d 828, 830-
31 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Bankers Standard Ins. Co. v. Olwell, 309 N.W.2d 799, 801-02
(Minn. 1981).
70 Kravitz, supra note 43, at 820, citing Moncivais v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 430
N.W.2d 438, 442 (Iowa 1988) (the "effect of this method . . . is to render the business pur-
suits exception meaningless in many commercial child care operations.").
71 Kravitz, supra note 43, at 820.
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The Crane approach broadly defines all aspects of child care as being inci-
dent to the nonbusiness pursuit of raising children as long as the care is being
provided by parents who are also caring for their own children. The problem
with this approach is that it may render the exception without meaning in many
commercial child care operations. 72 A parent may choose not to work outside
the home because of the income potential in caring for children in her own
home. And, as states increasingly demand licensing and registration of home
child care, it may increasingly look like a business whether or not the care is
being provided by a parent who is also watching her or his own children.
73
2. The Stanley Analysis.
In Stanley, a one-year-old child fell into a bed of hot coals in a fireplace
while her child care provider was in the kitchen preparing lunch for herself, her
own children, and the other children she was caring for.7 4 The Alabama Su-
preme Court did not identify the lunch preparation or the specific act of the
child as the injury-causing activity, but rather held that the provider's failure to
supervise was the activity that caused the injury. 75
Subsequent courts have focused on Stanley's conclusion that the provider's
negligent supervision is responsible for injuries at day care. 76 The negligent
supervision is viewed as incident to a business pursuit and thus falls outside the• 77 7
exception. For example, in Republic Insurance Co. v. Piper,78 the court
stated, ".... nothing could be more a part of the business of operating a day care
home than supervision of the children under the licensee's care .... 79
72 Moncivais v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 430 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Iowa 1988).
73 Kravitz, supra note 43, at 821.
74 Stanley, 361 So. 2d at 1031.
7 Id. at 1032. (The Stanley court appears to have misread Crane when it expressed its dis-
agreement with Crane's conclusion that child care for pay is ordinarily a non-business pur-
suit. In fact, Crane had bypassed the question of whether child care in the home was a busi-
ness pursuit. Rather, the Crane court went directly to the exception, and finding that the
exception to the exclusion would apply, concluded that, whether or not the child care was a
business pursuit, was irrelevant. See Kravitz, supra note 43, at 822.)
76 Kravitz, supra note 43, at 822
77 id.
78 517 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Colo. 1981). The Piper court opted for a Stanley-type analysis,
while acknowledging the arguments in Crane and Tilley. In Piper, a child being cared for by
the insured burned her hands in scalding water, and "somehow received a bruise on her
nose." Piper was licensed by the state to operate a day care facility, had joined a voluntary
association of licensed day care operators which had arranged for a group liability policy,
had declined to arrange for coverage under the group policy, and had declared her business
as babysitting on tax returns. Moreover, the court found that the burns "were the result of an
intentional act" and that Ms. Piper was the only person in the home "physically capable of
performing that act." The court distinguished the facts in Piper from those in Crane and
Tilley, and speculated that even the Crane and Tilley courts would find in favor of the insurer
if presented with facts similar to Piper. Id., at 1104-08.
79 Id. at 1106.
[Vol. 1:323
DWELLO V. AMERICAN RELIANCE
Thus, a Stanley analysis is focused upon the first question, "Is it a business
pursuit?" If the home child care is determined to be a business pursuit, the
Stanley approach characterizes "lack of supervision" as an activity that is inci-
.... 80
dent to the business pursuit of caring for children. This interpretation tends to• • • 81
make the exception superfluous in the context of home child care. Because it
can be argued that virtually any injury to a child at home child care is attribut-
able to a lack of supervision, the exception to the business pursuits exclusion,
as it applies to home child care, appears to have been eliminated entirely in a
Stanley analysis.
3. The Tilley Analysis.
In Gulf Ins. Co. v. Tilley, 82 the child care provider was preparing coffee for
herself and a visiting friend. A child being cared for was injured when she
pulled the cord of the coffee percolator, which overturned, spilling hot coffee
over the child. The federal district judge concentrated on the preparation of
coffee as the activity to be analyzed, and stated, "it is manifest that the prepara-
tion of hot coffee is an activity that is not ordinarily associated with a babysit-
ter's functions and . . . clearly appears as an activity which was 'incident to
non-business pursuits."'
83
Tilley and its progeny define narrowly "the 'activity' that caused the injury,
and then consider whether that particular activity is ordinarily incident to a
business or nonbusiness pursuit." The Tilley analysis is appealing because it
requires a consideration of the facts of an injury before it "forecloses a decision
on coverage in child-care cases."' 85 A problem with the Tilley approach is that
there appears to be no clear delineation between activities incident to business
pursuits and activities incident to nonbusiness pursuits, and this lack of clarity
"inevitably leads the courts to engage in formalistic hair-splitting only to arrive
at conclusions that appear horribly contrived."
86
Thus, little uniformity exists across jurisdictions in the interpretation of
the exception to the business pursuits exclusion of liability coverage for injuries
80 Moncivais, 430 N.W.2d at 442.
81 Kravitz, supra note 43, at 822-23, stating "A Stanley analysis, therefore, seems to involve
one question, 'Is it a business pursuit?' asked twice. The first answer is applied to the exclu-
sion and the second to the exception. If the child-care operation is a business pursuit, it is
excluded from coverage under the exclusion clause. And, if it is a business pursuit, it cannot
be excepted from the exclusion because the negligent supervision of children is not 'ordinar-
ily incident to a nonbusiness pursuit."'
82 280 F.Supp. 60 (N.D. Ind. 1967) aff'd, 393 F.2d 119 (7"h Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
83 Id. at 65.
84 Kravitz, supra note 43, at 824, citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Moore, 430 N.E.2d
641, 645 (I11. App. 1981) (after a child was burned by spilling a pan of boiling water which
the provider was boiling for herself, her own children, and her day care children, the activity
was found to be incident to a nonbusiness pursuit.)
85 id.
861d.
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that occur in the context of home child care. Some courts find the exclusion
and its exception ambiguous, and tend to rule in favor of the insured. 87 The
Tilley approach focuses on the specific activity that resulted in injury to deter-
mine whether it was incident to business or nonbusiness pursuits. Although out
of favor, the Crane approach takes a general view that the exception usually
applies if providers are also caring for their own children. The Stanley ap-
proach takes a seemingly opposite general view that the exception almost never
would apply in the context of child care, interpreting injury to a child as result-
ing from failure to supervise, clearly incident to the business pursuit of child
care.
III. DWELLO RE-EXAMINED
A. Facts & Opinion
Alisa Dwello was a single working mother, whose daughter, Stefanie, was
seven years old. 88 Dwello asked her neighbor, Patty Kenyon, to care for Stefa-
nie while Dwello worked. Kenyon agreed, and watched Stefanie five days a• 8 9
week for approximately one month. Dwello paid Kenyon $50 per week, even
though the Kenyons later testified that they would have watched Stephanie
without compensation.9 0 The Kenyons' dog attacked Stefanie in July 1995, se-• • •91
verely injuring her face, head and eye. The next month, Dwello filed a com-
plaint against Kenyon and her husband, alleging that the Kenyons failed to
adequately protect Stefanie from their dog.
92
The Kenyons sought indemnity and defense from the carrier of their home-
owners insurance, American Reliance Insurance Company.93 American Reli-
ance filed for declaratory relief in March 1996, "alleging that they had no duty
to defend or indemnify the Kenyons." 94 In September of that year, the district
court allowed Dwello to intervene in the action for declaratory judgment. 95
In a one-day bench trial in July 1997, American Reliance argued that "the
'business pursuits' provision in the homeowner's policy shielded American Re-
liance from liability."'96 The Kenyons argued that compensation was not a fac-
87 See e.g., Foster v. Allstate Insurance Co., 637 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
88 Dwello, 990 P.2d 190, 191 (1999) (per curiam), 1999 Nev. LEXIS 76.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. (Dwello alleged that Kenyons knew of the propensity of their dog to bite, and "that
they failed to inform Dwello that the dog had bitten other children.")
93 id.
94 Id. (The Kenyons then filed for Chapter Seven bankruptcy.)
95 Id.
96 Id. (The provision states: Comprehensive Personal Liability Coverage and Medical Pay-
ments to Others Coverage Does Not Pay for Bodily Injury or Property Damage: Arising out
of your business pursuits. This also includes your occasional or part-time business pursuits.)
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tor, because they would have watched Stefanie without compensation. Dwello
argued that the exclusion was not applicable because Kenyon watched only one
child, was not licensed, and did not advertise. 97 The district court found that
Kenyon watched Stefanie from 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. for one month and that
the compensation of $50 per week was for services rendered, constituting (for
that month) "approximately forty percent of Kenyon's total monthly salary."
The district court concluded that Kenyon was engaged in a business pursuit
within the meaning of the policy provision, and granted the petition of Ameri-• • 98
can Reliance for declaratory relief. Dwello appealed.
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the judgment of the district court,
holding that "American Reliance had no duty to defend or indemnify the Ken-
yons under the homeowner's insurance policy pursuant to the business pursuit
exclusion." 9 9  The court reasoned that whether the babysitting triggered the
business pursuits exclusion is a question of fact for the trial court, and that
"only when this finding is clearly erroneous will this court reverse."100 Not
surprisingly, the court found that the exclusion provision was clear and unam-
biguous,'' and that it was "for the trial court to determine whether the home-
owner is engaged in a 'business pursuit.
' 102
Acknowledging that other courts are divided on the issue of whether the
"business pursuits exception" 103 applies to babysitting, 10 4 the court agreed that
the appropriate factors in considering whether babysitting constitutes a business
pursuit are (1) continuity or customary engagement in the activity, and (2)
profit motive. The court found that those factors were considered by the
trial court, and concluded, "there was substantial evidence to support the dis-
trict court's findings."'
10 6
The court also held that the exception to the business pursuit exclusion did
not apply, commenting,
A babysitter's primary role is to maintain a safe, healthy environment and to
keep the child out of harm's way. While the babysitter's services are engaged,
the babysitter maintains a continuous duty to provide for the child."7
Without citing Stanley, the court followed the Stanley approach in finding that
97 id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 192.
'o Id. at 191, citing Trident Construction v. West Electric, 105 Nev. 423, 426, 776 P.2d
1239, 1241 (1989).
101 Id. at 191. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
102 Id.
103 Id.at 192. The court used the term "exception" rather than "exclusion." The exception to
the exclusion ("ordinarily incident to nonbusiness pursuits") is not considered until the final
paragraph of the opinion.
104id.
105 Id. citing Carroll v. Boyce, 640 A.2d 298 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
106 id.
107 id.
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the dog bite was "related to negligent supervision, and was not 'incidental to
non-business pursuits."' 
10 8
B. Analyzing The Court's Decision
In its very brief opinion in Dwello, the Supreme Court of Nevada disposed
of an issue that has been troubling courts throughout the country for more than
three decades.10 9 After a cursory description of the facts of the case, the court
correctly observed that other courts are divided on the issue of the business
pursuits exclusion, used a few sentences to describe the approach used by one
of those courts, and declared it appropriate. The court then made a passing ref-
erence to the exception to the exclusion, and held that it did not apply. The
court's conclusion that the trial court had not made reversible error may have
been a correct decision, but its brevity provides little guidance as to how the
business pursuits exclusion may be viewed given varied fact patterns.
Since Dwello was apparently the first consideration by the court of the
business pursuits exclusion in a homeowners insurance policy as it applied to
home child care, the Court might have done a de novo review. Instead, it
seemed merely to consider whether the trial court had made any reversible er-
ror, and concluded that it had not.
1. The Business Pursuits Exclusion
The court acknowledged that other courts are "divided on the issue of
whether babysitting falls within the business pursuits exception."' 110 As a way
to introduce the two-part test of Aurigemma, I II the court cited Carroll v.
Boyce, 112 but did not describe any facts in Carroll, or any other cases, to illus-
trate how the two-part test is applied. Nor did it describe the manner of apply-
ing the test here, or identify any of the many issues other courts have consid-
ered in determining whether the prongs of the test applied to their own cases.
The court merely declared that the factors in the two-part test were the "appro-
priate factors to consider," 113 found that the district court had considered those
108 Id.109 The two-part test was originated in 1965 in Home Ins. Co. v. Aurigemma. See supra note
41 and accompanying text.
"0 Dwello, 990 P.2d at 192. (The court probably intended "exclusion" rather than "excep-
tion"). See supra, note 103.
See supra note 41 and accompanying test. The Court did not mention A urigemma.
112 640 A.2d 298 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). The Carroll court acknowledged the
two-part test of continuity and profit motive as described in Sun Alliance Ins. Co. of Puerto
Rico, Inc. v. Soto, 836 F.2d 834, 836 (3rd Cir. 1988). In Carroll, Ms. Boyce cared for the
Carroll infant (6-10 months old) for a six-month period for compensation of $85 per week.
This arrangement was to continue indefinitely. Mrs. Boyce also cared for another child for
compensation during part of that period. Id. at 387. Thus, the facts of Carroll appear to be
readily distinguishable from Dwello on both prongs of the two-part test.
13 Dwello, 990 P.2d at 192.
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factors, and concluded that there was "substantial evidence to support the dis-
trict court's findings."
114
a. The Two-Part Test.
The factors in the Aurigemma two-part test are continuity and profit mo-
tive.l15 To assist in determining whether continuity and profit motive are pre-
sent, other courts have considered such factors as whether the provider adver-
tised the child care service, was registered or licensed by the state, declared the
child care services as a business for tax purposes, cared for children a substan-
tial amount of time, cared for several children, or received substantial income
from child care services. 1
16
The two-part test, and each related issue, is a fact-based inquiry. While the
district court and the Supreme Court presumably had access to additional in-
formation, the facts presented in the opinion are fairly sparse. Kenyon cared
for Stefanie from 6 a.m. until 4 p.m., five days a week, for approximately one
month. 117 Evidence indicated that Kenyon only watched one child "not her
own," that she was not licensed, and did not advertise.1 18 The court did not in-
dicate whether Kenyon also watched her own children, had a history of watch-
ing other children, or intended to continue to watch children. There is no indi-
cation as to whether the arrangement between Dwello and Kenyon was for a
specified time or whether it was expected to continue indefinitely into the fu-
ture. 119 Without any consideration of facts that would be pertinent to the in-
quiry, it is odd that the court would affirm based upon the trial court's fact-
finding.
Continuity. Absent the discussion of any of these other factors, one must
assume that the court reached its decision on the basis of the facts it presented.
To this court, the care of Stefanie five days a week for a month was adequate to
meet the "continuity" prong of the test. With similar facts, other courts haveS 12012
reached different conclusions. In Camden Fire Ins. Ass 'n v. Johnson, 121 the
state paid a grandmother eighty dollars a month to care for her grandson while
his mother worked, but because she was not licensed and did not advertise her
babysitting services, the court found that the child care was not a business pur-
suit. In Haley v. Allstate Ins. Co.,122 the court acknowledged that occasional
t 4 id.
115 See supra Part II.A.
116 id.
117 Dwello, 990 P.2d at 191.
118 id.
119 Because Stefanie was seven years old, it is likely that Stefanie would be back in school
only a few weeks later, and that Kenyons' care of her would have stopped, or changed sig-
nificantly, when school started.
120 See also supra Part II.A.
121 294 S.E.2d 116, 117 (W.Va. 1982).
122 529 A.2d 394 (N.H. 1987).
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babysitting for a neighbor was not continuous, but that the exclusion must be
considered where the child care occurred more than eight hours a day, five days
per week for several months. 
123
Most courts have found that regular child care as in Dwello meets the "con-
tinuity" prong of the test, but have looked to the presence of the other factors
for confirmation. The absence of these other indicia of continuity in Dwello
could as easily have resulted in a finding that the child care was not continuous.
Profit Motive. The court found that Dwello paid Kenyon $50 per week,• 124
and found that the payment was for services rendered. To the court, these
facts alone were sufficient to meet the "profit motive" prong of the two-part
test. The language of the court is revealing. Rather than simply stating that
Kenyon was paid "$50 per week for 4 weeks," the court found that the reve-
nues for Stefanie's care accounted for "approximately forty percent of Ken-
yon's total monthly salary,"' 125 implying a level of significance and continuity
not present with the more straightforward wording.
The Kenyons argued that profit was not a motive, and that they "would
have watched Stephanie [sic] without compensation." 126  Presumably, if
Dwello had given Kenyon additional money for food or snacks, the court
would have mentioned it, so it must be inferred that during the period from
6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Kenyon probably provided breakfast, lunch, and snacks.
Thus, Kenyon watched and fed Stefanie for fifty hours a week for $50, less the
cost of food, supporting Kenyon's contention that profit was not a motive in her
care of Stefanie.
Courts have generally found that the business pursuits exclusion does not
affect coverage unless the activity has a purpose of eaming a livelihood or sub-
sistence. 127 If the compensation is a token amount, a court may find that the
insured was not engaged in a business pursuit. 128 If, however, the amount of
compensation was more substantial, 129 or if the child care would be terminated
123 Id. at 396, referring to Stanley v. American Fire and Casualty Co. 361 So. 2d 1030 (Ala.
1978).
124 Dwello, 990 P.2d at 191.
125 Id. The court was careful to specify "her" monthly income, not the income of the family.
Since the Kenyons had a homeowners insurance policy, it is likely that they owned their
home. May it be inferred that Mr. Kenyon had the primary income in the family, or that the
Kenyons had more substantial income sources? Even if the $50 per week constituted 100%
of her income, it may have had no discernable effect on the family income.126 id.
127 Home Ins. Co. v. Aurigemma (1965) 257 N.Y.S. 2d 980. 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Spec. Term,
1965). See also Appleman, supra note 32, § 4501.10.
128 Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Collins, 222 S.E. 2d 828, 830 (Ga. App., 1975), (find-
ing that a woman who received five dollars daily for the care and feeding of two children
was not a business pursuit).
129 McClosky v. Republic Ins. Co., 559 A.2d 385, 387 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., 1989) (cert. de-
nied), 566 A.2d 101 (1989), (finding that watching seven children for $195 per week consti-
tuted substantial compensation).
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if the parent did not pay the fee, 130 courts have often found that the provider
was motivated by profit or income.
Whether the $50 weekly compensation that Kenyon received from Dwello
was "substantial" is a matter of interpretation and judgment. From the Ken-
yons testimony, the compensation was not expected or even necessary.131 Fur-
ther, from their testimony it seems unlikely that Kenyon would have terminated
the care if Dwello had gotten behind on her payment, or had been unable to
pay.
The court's decision seems to have been made on the simple finding that if
Kenyon received compensation, the "profit motive" prong of the two-part test
was met. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the court's considera-
tion went any deeper.
b. Was the Two-Part Test Met in Dwello?
The Dwello case resembles a neighborly accommodation more than a child
care business with a purpose of income or profit. The court's analysis was su-
perficial, without apparent consideration of the many issues and nuances that
have troubled other courts.
Because the child care occurred daily for a month, the court found continu-
ity without the presence of supporting factors such as licensing, advertising, or
care of multiple children that other courts have found useful or necessary to de-.• 132
termine continuity. Because the provider was compensated, the court found
profit motive without considering whether the compensation was substantial,
expected, or demanded.
The district court's conclusion that the two-part test (continuity and profit
motive) could trigger the business pursuits exclusion was appropriate, but its
finding that Dwello met both prongs of that test was superficial. Despite the
absence of any other factors that other courts have found to be associated with
"continuity," 13 3 the court's finding that Kenyon's care of Stefanie was "con-
tinuous" was, perhaps, plausible. But the court's finding of a profit motive in
Dwello is without foundation. Profit motive has usually required that the pay-
ment be substantial and required. 34 Here, it was neither. There was no evi-
dence presented to suggest that Kenyon had ever relied on income from child
care, and neither expected nor required payment; and, although Kenyon re-
ceived some remuneration, the amount was insignificant. 135
The court's decision in Dwello that Kenyon's care of Stefanie was a busi-
130 See, e.g., Virginia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hagy, 352 S.E.2d 316, 317 (Va. 1987), (where the in-
sured terminated child care contracts with parents who were unable to pay her fees).
131 Dwello, 990 P.2d at 191.
132 See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
133 See supra Part II.A.
134 See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
13' Dwello, 990 P.2d at 191.
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ness pursuit was ill-founded because the two-part standard applied by the court
was not properly met. While the "continuity" prong of the test may have been
plausible, there is no logic or precedent to support the court's finding of a
"profit motive" beyond the mere fact of the token payment.
In fact, the Aurigemma two-part test may not be adequate to distinguish be-
tween business and nonbusiness pursuits except in extreme cases. For most
cases, findings of continuity and profit motive are largely discretionary. In the
future, Nevada courts should employ a seven-factor test if "continuity" or
"profit motive" are not clear. These factors should include:
* licensing or registration with the state or other regulatory authority,
" advertising, including flyers, posters and word-of-mouth,
* care of multiple children,
* the caregiver has cared for children over a prolonged period,
" expectation of meaningful aggregate remuneration from all child care
activities,
" inclusion of child care income or expenses on the caregiver's tax re-
turns, and
" lack of any prior relationship between the caregiver and either the child
or the parents. The presence of any one or a combination of these fac-
tors would tend to support a finding that the child care was a business
pursuit, while the absence of any of these factors would mitigate against
such a finding.
Based upon the information provided in the opinion, none of these seven
indicia of a business pursuit was present in Dwello.
2. The Exception to the Exclusion
Even when an activity is found to be a business pursuit, the exclusion does
not apply to injuries that are "ordinarily incident to nonbusiness pursuits." 136
In a cursory reference to the exception, the court found that it did not apply. 
13 7
Again, the facts in Dwello are sparse. Stefanie was attacked and injured by
Kenyon's dog, which had apparently bitten children before. There is no refer-
ence to the dog being restrained, whether the child provoked it, or whether the
attack may have been foreseeable. 1
38
Three dominant approaches to the exception have been taken by other
courts. 139 The Crane analysis has not been applied since 1983, and, in any
event, requires knowledge of whether Kenyon was also caring for her own
136 See supra Part ll.B.
137 There is no reference to any district court consideration or decision about the exception.
138 The fact that Stefanie was not attacked until a month after Ms. Kenyon began babysitting
her suggests that the dog may not have posed an ever-present danger, unlike, for example, a
swimming pool or rickety staircase.
139 See supra Part I.B.1-3.
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child or children. 140 If Kenyon were also watching her own children, a Crane
analysis would probably have resulted in a finding that Stefanie's injury was
incident to a nonbusiness pursuit, as an exception to the business pursuits ex-
clusion.
Without analysis or discussion, the Dwello court adopted the Stanley ap-
proach, 14 1 which holds that supervision of Stefanie was the business pursuit,
and that the injury resulted from Kenyon's failure to supervise, clearly incident
to the business pursuit of supervision.'
42
The court did not analyze the incident itself to determine whether that spe-
cific injury was incident to a business or nonbusiness pursuit. A Tilley analysis
considers the specific activity to determine whether the exception applies.
143
In Dwello, the inquiry under the Tilley analysis would be whether the attack by
the dog was incident to a business or nonbusiness pursuit. Even courts that fol-
low the Tilley approach are divided. The exception has been held to apply
when a child crawled through a fence and drowned in a puddle on a tarp cover-
ing the swimming pool 14 4 and when a child was burned when she overturned a
coffee percolator. Conversely, when a car in the driveway struck a child, a
court ruled that the injury bY a car driven by another day-care parent was inci-
dent to a business pursuit. Yet another court, after a child was killed when
she touched an exposed wire on a vacuum cleaner, observed that vacuuming
may be incident to business pursuits in some instances and nonbusiness pur-
suits in others. 1
4 7
A Tilley analysis is driven by the facts of the case. In order to determine
whether the dog attack was incident to business or nonbusiness pursuits, it may
have been useful to determine whether playing with the dog was part of Stefa-
nie's ordinary activity, or whether it was an isolated incident. It would have
been useful to determine whether the dog was simply part of the environment,
as the swimming pool was in Reed. 148 It may have been useful for the court to
consider whether the injury came as a result of failing to supervise or restrain
the dog, rather than the child. Under a Tilley analysis, it seems likely that the
activity would be viewed as incident to a nonbusiness pursuit, thereby applying
the exception to the business pursuits exclusion.
By selecting the Stanley approach, without consideration of any other
analyses, the court side-stepped the need to examine the nature of the activity
140 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
14' Dwello, 990 P.2d at 192.
142 See supra Part III.A.
143 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
144 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Reed, 873 SW 2d 698 (Tex. 1993).
145 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
146 Economy Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bassett, 525 N.E.2d 539, 542 (I11. App. 5d 1988).
147 Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 800, 801 (Or. Ct. App. 1987), review denied,
750 P.2d 497 (1988).
148 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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that led to Stefanie's injuries. With the court's unquestioned acceptance of
Stanley's proposition that an injury to a child at child care is almost definition-
ally a result of failure to supervise, it is difficult to imagine any instance in
which the exception to the business pursuits exclusion would apply in the con-
text of child care in Nevada.
3. The Standard of Review
Before Dwello, the Supreme Court of Nevada had not previously consid-
ered the business pursuits exclusion to liability coverage in homeowners poli-
cies. The court reviewed the case to determine whether the decision of the dis-
trict court was erroneous and whether the decision should be reversed. 149
The court stated, "whether the babysitting in this situation triggers the
business pursuits exception ... is a question of fact for the trial court." The
court further stated that a decision by the lower court would only be reversed if
its findings were clearly erroneous. The court found that the district court
had considered the relevant facts and affirmed its judgment.
Instead, the court might have done a de novo review. The question here
was not merely whether the district court had considered the relevant facts in
applying the law. Dwello posed mixed questions of law and fact. In a de novo
review, the "linchpin issue is, of course, distinguishing fact from law." 152 The
trial court relied on Carroll in its consideration of the exclusion, and on the
Stanley premise in its passing consideration of the exception to the exclu-
sion, even though the facts of both cases are easily distinguishable from
Dwello. 1
54
In its brief opinion, there is no evidence that the court even considered al-
ternative fact patterns of other cases which resulted in quite different findings,
varying interpretations of the law by other courts, or how varying facts and le-
gal interpretations might have affected the outcome of this case.
CONCLUSION
Dwello provided the Supreme Court of Nevada with a set of facts that af-
forded the court an opportunity to articulate the law in Nevada regarding the
149 Dwello, 990 P.2d at 191, 192.
150 1d. at 191.
151 Id., citing Trident, 105 Nev. at 426, 776 P.2d at 1241. The Trident court also stated,
"Where the trial court, sitting without a jury, makes a determination predicated upon con-
flicting evidence, that determination will not be disturbed on appeal where supported by sub-
stantial evidence." Id. at 1242, citing Dickstein v. Williams, 93 Nev. 605, 608, 571 P.2d
1169, 1171 (1977).
152 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS, A 1995 PRIMER ON STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN FEDERAL CIVIL
APPEALS, 161 F.R.D. 123, 129.
153 Dwello, 990 P.2d at 192.
154 See supra note 112 and accompanying text for the facts of Carroll; See supra Part II.B.2
for discussion of Stanley.
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application of the business pursuits exclusion from liability coverage in home-
owners insurance policies, with particular reference to home child care. With
the proliferation of home child care and many other types of home-based busi-
ness activities, continuing challenges to the business pursuits exclusion in li-
ability insurance policies can be expected. Dwello provides little insight or
guidance as to what facts may trigger the exclusion or how the court may inter-
pret the exclusion - or its exception - in the future. Curiously, although the
court acknowledged divergence in the interpretations given to the business pur-
suits exclusion in other jurisdictions, it neither explained nor analyzed those
varying interpretations.
Dwello was poorly decided. Contrary to the general approach of courts in
interpreting insurance policy provisions, the Dwello court construed the busi-
ness pursuits exclusion very broadly, and construed the exception very nar-
rowly. 155 The sparse facts provided by the court do not support a finding that
the child care at issue constituted a business pursuit, based upon the two-part
test (continuity and profit motive) employed by the court, particularly since
none of the seven indicia of a child care business were present here. Fur-
ther, the court simply eliminated the exception to the exclusion by asserting
that the injury resulted from a failure to supervise, rather than first analyzing
the specific activity that led to the injury, then deciding whether the exception
should be applied.
r57
The implications of Dwello are significant. Under its broad interpretation,
virtually any babysitting services would appear to trigger the exclusion. Even
the teenager who babysits for a variety of siblings, friends, or neighbors a few
times a week for pocket money would appear to meet both the continuity and
profit motive prongs of the business pursuits two-part test as interpreted by the
court in Dwello. Moreover, with the Dwello court's unquestioned acceptance
of the narrow Stanley approach to the exception to the exclusion, the babysitter
appears to be responsible for any injury to a child under his or her care. 15Z
To consider the exception to the business pursuits exclusion, the court
should have used the Tilley approach, rather than opting for the simplistic ap-
peal of Stanley. Even if the court's judgment that Patti Kenyon's care of Stefa-
nie Dwello constituted a business pursuit were correct, under a Tilley analysis
the court would have looked to the particular circumstances of the injury to de-
155 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
156 See supra Part III.B. 1.
157 See supra Part III.B.2.
158 The exposure of the babysitter, or the parents of a teenage babysitter, could be great.
The author consulted with several insurance carriers. Evidently there is no rider commonly
available to provide liability coverage for babysitting or child care services by a member of a
covered family. Further, a liability policy specifically for child care services is available
only to licensed child care enterprises. Finally, umbrella liability coverage is intended to
supplement the liability coverage of the homeowners policy and would normally apply only
after the homeowners policy limits are exhausted - thus, the umbrella coverage could extend
the limits but likely would be subject to the same exclusions as the underlying policy.
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termine whether it was really incidental to the business pursuit of child care.
The court should also have considered the reasonable expectations of the in-
sured, and followed the general practice of interpreting insurance policy exclu-
sions narrowly and exceptions to those exclusions broadly. 
159
With a more thorough analysis of the business pursuits exclusion and its
exception, with some consideration of the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties, and with application of the seven-factor test, 16 it seems likely that the
court would have construed the policy language in favor of the Kenyons. But
even if the court had ultimately ruled in favor of the insurance carrier anyway,
a more thorough analysis would have provided far greater insight, confidence,
and predictability in viewing future child care liability issues that inevitably
will arise.
159 See supra Part 1.
160 See supra Part III.B. 1.
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